Napoleon III, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, was a visionary, perhaps even an idealist, who had substantial support among the lower social orders because of his sympathies for the poor and working classes. However, he was also an imperial populist who appealed to both left and right political views, while his ambitions for power demonstrated opportunism and ambiguity. His victory in the 1848 election for the newly-created office of president undermined the left and prevented the reactionary Louis-Eugène Cavaignac from restoring the old constitution. The thwarting of those who had put their lives on the line in the 1848 uprising prevented more far-reaching democratisation occurring, but the comprehensive defeat of Cavaignac also thwarted a rekindling of the violence of the summer.
However, Napoleon’s support for democracy and republicanism was revealed as superficial in 1852 when he engineered a coup to keep himself in office. Although ostensibly aimed at the conservative-controlled National Assembly, the greatest repression was visited upon the radical left. A highly-manipulated plebiscite followed which bestowed popular approval upon Napoleon. He now reduced the power of the National Assembly which negated the restoration of universal male suffrage, instituted press censorship, and then declared himself emperor, endorsed by an improbable 97% support in another dubious plebiscite. Liberal reforms to the legislature in the 1860s were minimal and did not hamper the emperor’s powers, particularly in foreign policy. There is no doubt that in the political and constitutional realm, Napoleon was autocratic, illiberal and an impediment to French democracy – yet outside of Paris and some other cities, he remained popular until the disasters of 1870-71.
Napoleon was fortunate in coming to power at a favourable stage of the economic cycle in both France and Europe. Probably under most regimes France’s economy would have burgeoned. Nevertheless, he was instrumental in utilising such an opportunity. He was a supporter of government taking an active role in the nation’s economy, particularly in building infrastructure. This included expanding the nation’s rail network, extending canals, improving ports, enlarging the merchant fleet, establishing new banks, reclaiming farmland, and encouraging major urban development. The latter involved substantial expenditure on public works, especially in Paris where Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann oversaw a massive program of urban renewal featuring wide airy boulevards. This proto-Keynesian policy, combined with free-trade agreements, stimulated economic growth and modernisation in the private sector where France’s industrial base expanded greatly, helping her to catch up with Britain, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Napoleon’s proactive economic strategy worked to France’s benefit both in the short and long term.
In the social realm, Napoleon was fairly liberal and sympathetic to working class needs and aspirations. He legalised workers’ right to organise and strike, regulated working hours and protected apprentices. Education was expanded at every level and greater access for girls was implemented. Without openly acting against it, Napoleon reduced the power of the Catholic Church, a phenomenon which would become more pronounced and significant in subsequent French history, but which owes much to the erosion of prestige and influence begun during his rule. Napoleon’s social policies were benign, but they were paternalistic, top-down measures which did little to encourage the lower orders to become active in French civic society. It is also arguable that he created (and stored up) social friction by tolerating anti-clericalism and alienating the Catholic Church.
It is in foreign policy that Napoleon’s actions produced the least favourable developments for France. His foray into the pointless Crimean War cost several hundred thousands lives and was essentially a vanity project designed to show that France was a major player in European power politics. His involvement in the Franco-Austrian war of 1859 was also designed to assert France’s position by humbling Austria. He has sometimes been portrayed as allying with Piedmont to support the cause of Italian unification, but his subsequent defence of the Papal States against incorporation into Italy and his signing of the Villafranca Treaty with Austria demonstrates that he did not want too large an Italian nation. His flirtation with the Confederacy and overtures towards recognition of the pro-slavery side in the US Civil War was a tawdry move which did nothing to elevate the international image of France.
Napoleon’s overseas empire-building also served France poorly in the short and long term. His attempt to gain control over Mexico ended in an ignominious withdrawal. The colonisation of Algeria required garrisoning it with 80,000 troops and effectively creating an apartheid system. This eventually produced the murderous Algerian War of Independence in the 20th century and the expulsion of the French settler community. Napoleon saw his empire-building as a benign project, called the mission civilisatrice, or civilising mission. This conceit was deployed to justify the acquisition of Indo-China in the 1860s, but it was more about imperial aggrandisement in competition with British empire-building. France’s far-eastern empire was a constant drain on her resources, a net liability rather than an economic asset. In 1941 it suffered humiliation at the hands of Japanese invaders, and again in 1954 with defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu by the Viet Minh.
Most disastrous of all was Napoleon’s complete mishandling of relations with the emerging German nation. He was outmanoeuvred by Bismarck at every turn, allowing himself to be drawn into war against Prussia for which France was ill-prepared. Compounding his misjudgements was his decision to go to the front as commander-in-chief. Roundly defeated and captured at Sedan, this was the end for Napoleon. For France it was an unmitigated disaster. With the north of the country under occupation, Paris besieged, a revolution in the capital, she was compelled to cede Alsace-Lorraine to the Prussians, obliged to pay enormous war reparations, and was plunged into constitutional crisis. In the long term, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and enduring enmity with Germany contributed to the First World War.
Napoleon III was a man of contradictions – a liberal autocrat, a French nationalist imperialist supportive of liberation for foreign peoples. His domestic legacy was a liberalising socio-economic platform upon which future progressive measures could be constructed, but a political structure that negated democracy and relied upon the benign authoritarianism of one man. His political legacy left France with problems she would not overcome for generations, while the consequences of his diplomatic and military decisions proved to be even worse.
